GCBR Organization Updates - October 2024
Updates from SecureBio, Sentinel Bio, Panoplia Laboratories, Johns Hopkins CHS, IBBIS, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, CLTR, CSR, Blueprint Biosecurity and Asia CHS
Welcome to our sixth newsletter of updates from organizations working to reduce global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). In this issue:
AI-Bio: multimodal virology benchmark, report on prioritization of biological capabilities of concern, risk index for AI-enabled biological tools
Nucleic acid synthesis: compliance information for the new US framework, exemption certificates, customer screening, new grants on nucleic acid governance
Pandemic prevention: a wikipedia page and path forward on far-UVC, a biomanufacturing plan for future biothreats, day zero antivirals for future pandemics
Three new organizations added: the Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, the Asia Center for Health Security, and Panoplia Laboratories
And more!
SecureBio
SecureBio is a nonprofit research organization working on new technologies and policy proposals to delay, detect, and defend against catastrophic pandemics.
The Nucleic Acid Observatory is expanding its wastewater sequencing to additional metropolitan sewersheds and will advance nasal swab efforts by sampling on the MIT campus. Lastly, the NAO's genetic engineering detection pipeline is now operational.
The AI team has developed an expert-validated benchmark for assessing troubleshooting capabilities in virology. The multimodal benchmark includes 350 questions, incorporating original micrographs and photos, and was created with contributions from 60 expert virologists, making it challenging even for experienced professionals. The team plans to share this tool with safety teams, regulatory bodies, and academic researchers focused on AIxBio safety.
SecureDNA has developed an Exemption Certification System to streamline the approval process for legitimate synthesis orders. SecureDNA also published a compliance guide to the OSTP screening framework that comes into force in October. Lastly, SecureDNA participated in the ERBC/NIST workshop on "Enabling Quality, Measurable Synthetic DNA Sequence Screening".
Sentinel Bio
Sentinel Bio is a new non-profit philanthropic fund that supports efforts to eliminate pandemic risks.
We have launched a handful of new efforts within our focus on strengthening the quality and prevalence of safeguards on advanced biotechnologies:
Nucleic Acid Governance
A $330,000 grant to the Engineering Biology Research Consortium to support stress-testing of synthesis screening systems.
A $150,000 grant to the Pandemic Action Network to support a roadmap for nucleic acid governance policy in the EU.
A $75,000 grant to Nikki Teran to explore ways to certify legitimate life scientists for accessing dual-use materials & tools.
AI-Bio
An $80,000 grant to Epoch AI to track the release of new AI-bio models and their biosecurity safeguards.
Our team will be in Singapore in December for a workshop on PPE for pandemic prevention and to visit the Asia Centre for Health Security.
Panoplia labs
Panoplia Laboratories is a nonprofit organization developing broad-spectrum antivirals that can be immediately deployed at the beginning of the next pandemic.
Executive Director Brian Wang published the piece “Day Zero Antivirals for Future Pandemics” in Asimov Press, highlighting new broad-spectrum antiviral technologies that could be deployed on day zero of the next pandemic.
We developed the capacity to carry out animal studies in-house and conducted our first pilot animal studies to test some of our broad-spectrum antiviral candidates against influenza.
We’re continuing to design and build new candidates, develop and validate new assays for testing those candidates in cell culture, and expand our in-house animal study capabilities.
IBBIS
IBBIS (news) is a Geneva-based nonprofit that works collaboratively with global partners to strengthen biosecurity norms and develop innovative tools to uphold them.
IBBIS has developed resources to support customer screening, including personas of legitimate (and illegitimate!) customers for nucleic acid synthesis, forms to support standardized information-collection, and a decision framework for synthesis providers. The customer personas, as presented at the September ERBC/NIST synthesis screening workshop, are now here: https://ibbis.bio/personas-for-follow-up-screening/
In September, IBBIS hosted a meeting on “Safeguarding the Responsible Transition to a Biobased Economy”, in collaboration with CEPI and WEF. The event gathered 35 industry leaders and innovators from around the world to explore collaborative opportunities for promoting biosecurity.
Find IBBIS at the Global Biofoundries Alliance Meeting (Oct 10-12), iGEM Responsibility Conference (Oct 23-24), ABSA Biosecurity and Biosafety Conference (Nov 1-6), Paris Peace Forum (Nov 11-12), and BWC Meeting of States Parties (Dec).
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (CHS) (newsletter) explores how new policy approaches, scientific advances and technological innovations can improve organizations, systems, policies and tools to prevent and respond to pandemics and biological threats.
CHS launched the Gene Synthesis Screening Information Hub to assist with compliance to recent US policy and share information with the international community, all in one place.
CHS continues to provide expertise on the topic of the intersection of AI and biosecurity, including in the US AISI, OECD, and EU AI Office. NIST adopted our two main recommendations for its Generative AI Risk Management Profile and NTIA cited our comment in its report on Dual-Use Foundation Models with Widely Available Model Weights.
We presented our Prioritization of AI-Enabled Biological Capabilities of Concern work to the US AI Safety Institute Consortium, of which we have been an active member. CHS leadership began serving as members of the Code of Practice Plenary, which will facilitate the proper application of the EU AI Act's rules for general-purpose AI models, including systemic risk taxonomy, risk assessment, and mitigation measures.
Council on Strategic Risks
The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) is a nonprofit, non-partisan security policy institute devoted to anticipating, analyzing and addressing core systemic risks to security in the 21st century, with special examination of the ways in which these risks intersect and exacerbate one another.
In November, the Global Biosecurity Accelerator will host discrete multilateral discussions in Seoul and Tokyo as part of our concerted effort to enshrine deterrence by denial for biodefense in allies’ national strategies and plans.
In September we published our report, A Biomanufacturing Plan to Confront Future Biological Threats, that built upon the expert panel cohosted with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
For our analysis of progress towards strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, read our latest blog post recapping the working group meeting in Geneva this August.
The next cohort of our Mid-Career Biodefense Bootcamp was announced in late August, and in September, we held enriching dialogues with officials in the Executive Office of the President, Departments of State and Defense, and past biodefense leaders. CSR has a rolling call for applicants for its future cohorts.
Our Fiscal Year 2025 Update to the CSR Biodefense Budget Breakdown went live in July.
Centre for Long-Term Resilience
The Biosecurity Policy Unit at the Centre for Long-Term Resilience (CLTR) works closely with the UK Government and other stakeholders to reduce extreme biological risks.
In July we published a report examining the near-term impact of AI on biological misuse, assessing the potential for current uplift from large language model access and the impact of forecasted trends over the next two years
In August we published a tracker independently assessing UK progress on the commitments listed in the Biological Security Strategy and collaborated on a response to the COVID-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report
We have commenced a collaboration with RAND and RAND Europe to create a new risk index for AI-enabled biological tools
We are excited to announce the addition of two new team members, Oliver Payne and Paul-Enguerrand Fady, who joined our biosecurity policy unit this September
Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health
The Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics (CCDD) at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health focuses on improving methods for infectious disease modeling and statistical analysis, reducing biosecurity risks, engaging with policymakers to enhance decision-making, and training the next generation of scientists.
In July, CCDD Director Prof. Marc Lipsitch and co-authors published an op-ed, “How to Reduce the Risk of a Catastrophic Lab Accident”, discussing the merits of the U.S. government’s new policy on risky pathogen research and how it can be improved.
Lipsitch co-chairs a working group of the WHO Technical Advisory Group on Dual Use Research - Responsible Use of Life Sciences (TAG DUR-RULS). The group provides recommendations to WHO on scientific, technical, and strategic issues related to monitoring and mitigating biorisks.
Blueprint Biosecurity
Blueprint Biosecurity is a nonprofit dedicated to achieving breakthroughs in humanity’s ability to prevent, mitigate, and suppress pandemics.
We’re facilitating a workshop to share the first draft of recommendations from our far-UVC blueprint. 25 leaders from government and academia will be gathering in Washington, D.C. to discuss the best path forward for gathering crucial evidence around far-UVC’s safety and efficacy.
We created the wikipedia page for far-UVC.
Our far-UVC team presented at the American Association for Aerosol Research annual conference.
Alongside colleagues at the Asia Center for Health Security, we’re hosting a PPE workshop in Singapore in December. The workshop will convene a group of advocates, researchers, manufacturers, and national stockpile decision makers to discuss the state of PPE across Southeast Asia.
We are continuing to investigate glycol vapors for their potential as an air disinfectant. We'll be releasing a shallow dive writeup soon.
Our tenth hire was made — a Communications Lead.
Asia Centre for Health Security
The Asia Centre for Health Security (ACHS) (newsletter) is a new academic think tank, set-up to strengthen Asia’s readiness for biological threats through scientific evidence, building of expertise and capabilities, and the forging of strategic partnerships. Our vision is a united and resilient Asia safeguarded against health security threats for the well-being of future generations.
The Asia Centre for Health Security has recently launched their website. Visit https://www.asia-chs.org to learn more about their research in biorisk management, biosecurity and international security, law and governance, and preparedness and response systems; education and training initiatives; meetings; and resources.
The inaugural 12-month ACHS Fellowship Program was launched in October 2024, to inspire and connect emerging biosecurity innovators.
Applications for the ACHS Fellowship 2025 close on 3 Nov 2024, 5pm (GMT+8:00). Visit https://asia-chs.org/fellowship-programme/achs-fellowship-program-2025 for more details.
Jobs, events, and other opportunities
You can find additional biosecurity and pandemic preparedness jobs on the 80,000 Hours job board.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative’s is looking for interns for their Global Biological Policy and Programs. You can apply here by Tuesday October 15, 2024.
Applications for the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity (ELBI) Fellowship at the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins are open until October 16, 2024.
Applications for the ACHS Fellowship 2025 close on 3 Nov 2024, 5pm (GMT+8:00). Visit https://asia-chs.org/fellowship-programme/achs-fellowship-program-2025 for more details.
Applications are now open for the 2025-26 Academic Year for the following opportunities at the Bloomberg School of Public Health:
1) full-time, in-person Health Security PhD track, a program focusing on GCBRs;
2) Health Security Scholarship to support DrPH students in dissertation research on a GCBR-related topic.
Upcoming conferences include: AI 4 Synbio Synthesis Screening Workshop (October 9), iGEM Jamboree and Responsibility Conference (October 23-26), ABSA International Biosafety and Biosecurity Conference (November 1-6).
The US AI Safety Institute has a Request for Comment on Safety Considerations for Chemical and/or Biological AI Models open until December 3, 2024.
SecureBio and Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc. are hosting a biosecurity happy hour on Thursday, October 24, from 6-8 pm in Boston. You can RSVP here: https://lnkd.in/eT7AwgiF
Asimov Press published a mini-issue on pandemic prevention, featuring articles on historical pandemic death statistics, DNA synthesis screening, broad-spectrum antivirals, and global biosurveillance.
We (Tessa and Anemone) just published an article on information hazards in collaboration with 80,000 Hours. This article is part of our anonymous answers series with Part One: Misconceptions and Part Two: Fighting pandemics.
We regularly solicit updates from a group of organizations that we believe are doing impactful work to reduce GCBRs in order to improve transparency, facilitate collaboration, and otherwise accelerate progress in our community.
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Cover image credit: The National Library of Medicine, http://resource.nlm.nih.gov/101447529