GCBR Organization Updates - March 2024
Updates from 1Day Sooner, Blueprint Biosecurity, CLTR, CSR, Effective Giving, IFP, CHS, SecureBio, and UNIDIR
Welcome to our third newsletter of updates from organizations working to reduce global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). In this issue:
An RFP to fund research on germicidal UV exposure
The launch of the US-UK Strategic Dialogue on Biosecurity
A reading list on the ARPA model
The public release of SecureDNA’s gene synthesis screening software
And more!
1Day Sooner
1Day Sooner is a nonprofit organization that advocates for high-impact medical studies and the efficient development and deployment of life-saving medical research and public health interventions.
1Day Sooner was a contributing partner in the launch of the International Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat’s implementation report on the 100 Day Mission
Building off our earlier advocacy work around the FDA’s proposed Emerging Pandemic Pathogens Program (EPPP), we coordinated another letter in support of appropriations for the EPPP to Congress
Blueprint Biosecurity
Blueprint Biosecurity is a new nonprofit dedicated to achieving breakthroughs in the ability to prevent, mitigate, and suppress pandemics.
We launched an RFP to fund research on far-UVC eye safety. We will soon begin disbursing funds to selected teams.
Far-UVC Program Director, Richard Williamson, spoke on a panel at the National Academies on indoor air chemistry impacts of germicidal UV.
As part of our far-UVC blueprint, we are undertaking work on modeling disinfection efficacy, a cost-benefit analysis, and epidemiological modeling of societal level implementation.
We helped support a Center for Health Security workshop exploring the uncertainties surrounding the use of far-UVC technology for pathogen inactivation and will be organizing sessions and presenting at other far-UVC related conferences and workshops this year.
We managed an extensive investigation into Pandemic-Proof PPE by Gryphon Scientific. We are also planning on hiring a Program Manager to focus on ongoing PPE work.
We worked with Sarah Carter to produce a report on Know Your Customer (KYC) frameworks for the Life Sciences which will be published shortly.
Working with Gryphon Scientific, we’ve launched a project on built environment transmission suppression where we’re mapping the field and investigating the most promising interventions.
Center for Long-Term Resilience
The Biosecurity Policy Unit at Centre for Longer-Term Resilience works closely with the UK Government and other stakeholders to reduce extreme biological risks.
We hosted a Biosecurity unit strategy retreat to refresh the high-level strategy for CLTR’s biosecurity policy work, and start planning our priorities for 2024.
We continue to work on assessing and mitigating biological risks at the intersection of AI and the life sciences (or AI:Bio). Over the last few months, this has included the development of a capability-based risk assessment for specialised biological tools and work on the potential biological risks posed by Frontier large language models (or LLMs). You can see some of our public-facing work on AI:Bio risks here.
We ran a workshop on overcoming challenges with synthetic nucleic acid screening implementation at the request of DSIT, and our public report is now available.
We provided feedback on several “chronic risk assessments” related to biosecurity issues being developed by the UK Cabinet Office.
Our Senior Biosecurity Policy Advisor, Sophie Rose, attended RAND’s workshop on Frontier AI and biosecurity in Washington DC in early February.
Council on Strategic Risks
The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) is a nonprofit, non-partisan security policy institute devoted to anticipating, analyzing and addressing core systemic risks to security in the 21st century, with special examination of the ways in which these risks intersect and exacerbate one another.
On January 16, CSR hosted the launch of the U.S.-UK Strategic Dialogue on Biosecurity, an official bilateral process that should maintain policy and programmatic momentum in both nations. A key theme was the changing biological threat landscape and its impact on pacing our biodefense efforts.
CSR has released a new report, Lessons from Kazakhstan for 2024: On the Front Lines of Nuclear and Biological Risks, highlighting Kazakhstan’s role within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the development of the International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS). We also co-hosted an event with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Kazakhstan’s work to address WMD risks.
CSR officially launched its Biodefense Budget Breakdown, a public data visualization tool to provide increased awareness for U.S. federal budgeting of biodefense efforts from 2019 to present. Look for analysis of the forthcoming President’s Budget Request!
We recently published a review of the 2023 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) Meeting of States Parties (MSP), highlighting slow momentum and challenges due to geopolitical tensions. The summary includes CSR’s Non-governmental Organization statement for the MSP.
Effective Giving - Biosecurity Program
Effective Giving is a nonprofit organization that helps major donors find the most promising solutions to the world's most pressing problems. Over the past few years, their Biosecurity team has focused on researching areas to prioritize within biosecurity, refining the investigation and evaluation of grants, and working closely with grantees.
In April, we will be in Singapore for the launch of the Asia Centre for Health Security, which is being established with support from EG. (Page on the NUS website; full website under development.)
We are currently focusing on refining our strategy for the coming years and, therefore, expect limited grantmaking capacity in the next few months. (This also owes partly to an increased focus within EG on grantmaking within our AI program at the moment.)
We are currently collecting insights on best practices in the philanthropic sector, including on strategy development and monitoring & evaluation – if you know someone with significant expertise on this topic who could be interested in speaking, please get in touch!
Institute for Progress
The Institute for Progress (IFP) is a non-partisan research and advocacy organization dedicated to accelerating scientific, technological, and industrial progress while safeguarding humanity’s future.
Letters to Congress
Congress Can Improve our Pandemic Preparedness: IFP led a coalition letter to congressional leaders, calling for specific reforms to the Federal Select Agent Program that would improve effective oversight of US laboratories.
Using PAHPA to Address Biosecurity Threats: IFP sent a letter to a bipartisan group of senators and representatives leading committees that are reauthorizing the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act that emphasized the need for PAHPA to adequately address biosecurity, not just public health concerns.
Resources
The ARPA Model: A Reading List: At IFP, we’ve been interested in the ARPA model for a while, and have written extensively about both the model’s strengths and its limitations. We’ve compiled this list of resources, last updated in January 2024, and will maintain it as a living resource that is updated periodically.
News
Statecraft Interview: How to Replicate Operation Warp Speed: On November 6th, the Institute for Progress, 1Day Sooner, and the Medical Countermeasures Coalition co-hosted a conference on Operation Warp Speed and its potential descendants. At the conference, former Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) Alex Azar answered these questions and more.
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (newsletter) explores how new policy approaches, scientific advances and technological innovations can improve organizations, systems, policies and tools to prevent and respond to pandemics and biological threats.
CHS published key takeaways from the November 2023 convening on AIxBio governance. We are calling for the creation of a public-private information sharing forum, a regulatory framework and a legal accountability framework. Please review the executive summary for more details.
CHS responded to NIST RFI on Implementing the AI Executive Order to guard against high-consequence bio risks. Our response focused on LLMs and BDTs, outlining biosecurity considerations related to generative AI risk management, AI evaluation and red teaming.
We led a coalition of more than 100 stakeholders, including Biotechnology Innovation Organization and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials to support a letter sent to congressional leadership urging the reauthorization of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
SecureBio
SecureBio is a nonprofit research organization working on new technologies and policy proposals to delay, detect, and defend against catastrophic pandemics.
SecureDNA has publicly released its cutting-edge gene synthesis screening software, made available free of charge. SecureDNA uses a novel exact-match search algorithm that detects all known hazards and predicted functional variants down to 30 base-pairs. The software has a negligible false alarm rate by using reverse screening to remove known non-hazards, which enables automated screening. Its threat database is continuously updated, and the system relies on privacy-preserving cryptography to maintain user confidentiality.
SecureBio has published a PPE report, which outlines a roadmap to: design pandemic-grade reusable PPE, including Power-Assisted Personal Respirators, incentivize cost-effective production, improve stockpiling, drive demand for pandemic-grade PPE, and safeguard supply chains and amplify manufacturing capabilities.
SecureBio has joined the U.S. AI Safety Institute Consortium convened by NIST to develop science-based and empirically backed guidelines and standards for AI measurement and policy.
UNIDIR
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an autonomous institution within the United Nations that conducts independent research on pressing global challenges related to disarmament, arms control and international security.
The newly launched BWC National Implementation Measures Database is continuously updated with new data. You can now find over 60 profiles of the State Parties of the BWC, including a section on Biosafety and Biosecurity measures of each country. Also, by searching for the term "biorisks", you can navigate over 45 resources, including legislation, guidelines, codes of conduct, associations, working papers, assistance and cooperation offers, and more. Give it a try!
Jobs, events, and other opportunities
You can find additional biosecurity and pandemic preparedness jobs on the 80,000 Hours job board.
The Center for Long-Term Resilience (CLTR) opened a job application in January for an additional Biosecurity Policy Advisor position, the full description of which can be found here. The application closes on March 8, 2024.
The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology is looking for Summer Fellows and Summer Interns.
Panoplia Labs - Researcher (Boston; R&D on anti-virals for future pandemics)
We (Tessa and Anemone) recently interviewed more than a dozen biosecurity experts about misconceptions and mistakes that they believe are common in their field, including the following areas of disagreement: What lessons should we learn from COVID-19? Should we prioritise preparing for the most likely pandemics or the most destructive pandemics — and is there even a genuine trade-off between these priorities? How big a deal are “information hazards” in biosecurity?
We regularly solicit updates from a group of organizations that we believe are doing impactful work to reduce GCBRs in order to improve transparency, facilitate collaboration, and otherwise accelerate progress in our community.
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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily represent those of the newsletter authors. This is an independent project conducted outside of the authors’ organizational affiliations.